Gibrat's law predicts that firm growth is purely random and should be independent of firm size. We use a random effects-random coefficient model to test whether Gibrat's law holds at the firm level in the Swedish energy market. No study has investigated whether Gibrat's law holds for individual firms in the energy sector. The present results support the claim that Gibrat's law is more likely to be rejected ex ante when an entire firm population is considered, but more likely to be confirmed ex post after market selection has "cleaned" the original population of firms or when the analysis treats more disaggregated data. From a theoretical viewpoint, the results are consistent with models based on passive and active learning, indicating a steady state in the firm expansion process and that, before it is achieved, Gibrat's law is violated in the short term, but holds in the long term when firms have reached a "steady state". These results indicate that approximately 70% of firms in the Swedish energy sector are in steady state, with only random fluctuations in size around that level over the 15 studied years.
Introduction
Gibrat's law (Gibrat, 1931) was the first attempt to explain in stochastic terms the systematically skewed pattern of firm size distribution in an industry (Aitchison and Brown, 1957) . A commonly accepted interpretation of the law is that the growth rate of a firm is independent of its size during a given period; therefore, firm growth can be seen as purely random.
Gibrat's law is sometimes referred to as the law of proportionate effect, because its basic underlying tenet is that the growth rate of a given firm is independent of its size at the beginning of the examined period. In other words, "the probability of a given proportionate change in size during a specified period is the same for all firms in a given industryregardless of their size at the beginning of the period" (Mansfield, 1962 (Mansfield, , p. 1031 . However, Audretsch et al. (2004) argue that the growth rate might differ among industrial sectors. For example, small firms might have a higher exit rate in a capital-intense industry characterized by economies of scale and high sunk costs, implying that small surviving firms should be characterized by higher growth rates than large firms. Since energy markets are characterized by exactly those features, it is of interest to study whether Gibrat's law holds in this setting.
In addition, knowledge of the growth patterns of energy firms is also of importance with respect to the recent deregulation of energy markets in Europe and the Nordic countries.
Before the deregulation, the Swedish electricity market was characterized (as in most other countries) by vertically integrated monopolies handling the production, distribution, and retail of electricity. It was said that the deregulation would structure the markets for competition and eliminate potential market power. (A more detailed overview of the Swedish energy market will be treated in section 3.) If some energy firms in Sweden are found to systematically and over time grow faster than do others, this would mean that, over time, the market would be characterized by high market concentration that could in turn lead to abuse of market power.
Many studies have tested whether Gibrat's law holds in different settings, and most recent studies of this sort tend to reject the hypothesis that growth is independent of firm size.
Instead, most studies find that small firms grow faster than do large firms (Audretsch et al., 1999; Calvo, 2006; Dunne and Hughes, 1994; Dunne et al., 1989; Evans, 1987a Evans, , 1987b Hall, 1987) . Other studies (e.g. Becchetti and Trovato, 2002; Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001; Geroski and Gugler, 2004; Hart and Oulton, 1996; Lotti et al., 2003; Mowery, 1983) claim that Gibrat's law holds, but only for firms larger than the minimum efficient scale (MES) of production in a given industry. Meanwhile, some studies (Bottazzi and Secchi, 2005; Droucopoulos, 1983; Hardwick and Adams, 2002) do not reject Gibrat's law.
Most of the above studies are based on data from manufacturing industries, but there are some interesting sector studies as well. Service industries were investigated by Variyam and Kraybill (1992) and Johnson et al. (1999) , credit unions by Barron et al. (1994) , farms by Weiss (1998) , the pharmaceutical industry by Bottazzi and Secchi (2005) , and the retail sector by Daunfeldt et al. (2012) . However, we are unaware of any study of Gibrat's law related to the energy sector.
In a recent study, Daunfeldt and Elert (2013) studied whether Gibrat's law holds in five-digit NACE industries in Sweden. The analysis was performed at different levels of aggregation.
Their results indicate that Gibrat's law is rejected at an aggregate level, with small firms outgrowing their larger counterparts. However, their results also indicate that, when the level of aggregation decreases, Gibrat's law is confirmed in approximately half of the studied industries. There seems to be a regularity in their results that suggests that the more disaggregated the level of analysis, the more often Gibrat's law is confirmed. Thus, it would be of interest to investigate Gibrat's law at an even lower level of aggregation, i.e. the individual firm level. This paper addresses the issue by explicitly examining whether or not Gibrat's law is rejected at the firm level in the Swedish energy industry in the three stages suggested by Mansfield (1962) . We use a dataset representing all limited firms in the Swedish energy sector from 1997 to 2011. A random coefficient model is constructed to test Gibrat's law at the individual firm level in this sector. This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, to our knowledge, this is the first paper investigating whether Gibrat's law on average holds in the Swedish energy sector. Second, as previous studies have demonstrated that the level of aggregation is of importance for results touching on Gibrat's law, with the law being rejected more often at higher levels of aggregation, it is important to study the issue at the lowest possible level of aggregation, i.e. the firm level.
The present results indicate that small firms in the Swedish energy sector, on average, grow faster than do larger firms. However, this finding is weakened when studying only surviving firms and firms above the industry MES. These results are in line with those of Daunfeldt and Elert (2013) and Lotti et al. (2009) . In addition, in about 70% of cases when using either revenue or employment as the indicator of firm size, Gibrat's law holds at the individual firm level, meaning that, during the studied period, the growth rate of these firms represents purely random variation around some "steady state" firm size. The results are even stronger when studying firms above the industry MES. In approximately 86% (revenue) and 79% (employment) of these cases, Gibrat's law cannot be rejected at the firm level. Three conclusions can be drawn from this. First, the pattern found by Daunfeldt and Elert (2013), i.e. that Gibrat's law holds more often in more disaggregated samples, is confirmed by the present study. Second, the present results also seem to confirm those of Lotti et al. (2009, p. 31) , that "a significant convergence toward Gibrat-like behavior can be detected ex post". This finding indicates that market selection "cleans" the original population of firms, so that the resulting industrial "core" does not depart from a Gibrat-like pattern of growth. Third, the results are consistent with models based on passive and active learning, which can be seen as defending the validity of the "law" in the long term.
An overview of the theoretical background to Gibrat's law is presented in section 3, while section 4 presents the Swedish energy market. The data and econometric model are presented in section 4, while the results are presented in section 5. Finally, section 6 summarizes and draws conclusions.
Gibrat's law: background
Debate regarding the validity of Gibrat's law has been ongoing for an extended time. Initial results regarding the relationship between firm growth and firm size confirmed Gibrat's law (see e.g. Simon, 1974, 1977; Mansfield, 1962; Wagner, 1992 Wagner, , 1994 , which predicts that the vast majority of active small firms will remain small and that there will be a scarcity of large firms in the market. Until the 1970s, the law was popular among both applied and theoretical industrial economists for two main reasons.
First, as Simon and Bonini (1958) pointed out, if one "incorporates the Law of Proportionate Effect in the transition matrix of a stochastic process … then the resulting steady-state distribution of the process will be a highly skewed distribution". This is a clear empirical pattern in most economic sectors, which are characterized by a lognormal size distribution with a large number of small-and medium-sized firms and a small number of large ones. The theoretical consistency between Gibrat's law and the observed size distribution across different industrial sectors was also proposed by Steindl (1965) .
Second, from a purely theoretical perspective, Gibrat's law has proven generally consistent with classical economic models of firm size distribution. For example, Viner (1932) suggested that business size distribution is the outcome of cost-minimizing firms, which are characterized by U-shaped long-term average cost functions while facing a given market demand. From the modern organizational theory perspective, Lucas (1978) postulated different size distributions to solve the problem of allocating productive factors over managers' various "talents", so as to maximize aggregate output. In his view, firms can be seen as collections of assets that managers can change arbitrarily from period to period. None of these theories contradicts the independence of firm growth and size, i.e. Gibrat's law.
However, in his seminal work, Mansfield (1962) investigated the US steel, petroleum, and tire sectors in different time periods, and rejected Gibrat's law in most cases. Later, he further demonstrated that if all firms from all sectors are included in the sample, Gibrat's law is also rejected; if only firms that survived the whole observed period are included, his results provided no conclusions about Gibrat's law. Finally, Mansfield's results indicated that Gibrat's law holds when the included firms exceed the industry MES. Therefore, firms behave differently depending on the stage at which they are tested. Mansfield was the first researcher to question the existence of Gibrat's law; since then, others have challenged its overall validity.
The law was first challenged on a purely theoretical basis by Jovanovic (1982) , who proposed a Bayesian model of noisy selection, according to which only efficient firms can grow and survive. In his model of passive learning, new firm founders are seen as risk-taking agents endowed with unknown, time-invariant characteristics. During the selection process, each firm learns whether it is more efficient than the others and takes optimal action based on the evidence ex post the prior distribution. This model appears consistent with the empirical rejection of Gibrat's law in the short term (Jovanovic, 1982, p. 650 ), but after noisy selection has been completed, there is no reason to reject the law.
The active learning model proposed by Ericson and Pakes (1995) , using the same line of argument as did Jovanovic (1982) , assumes that firms maximize the expected discounted value of the future net cash flow, conditional on the current information set. It assumes that the firm knows the current value of the parameter that determines the distribution of its profits, but that the value changes over time in response to the stochastic outcomes of the firm's own investments.
Those two models based on passive and active learning suggest that there exists a "steady state" in the firm expansion process. Gibrat's law is violated in the short term when smaller firms accelerate their growth in comparison with their larger and more experienced counterparts, but holds in the long term when firms reach their steady state.
In the late 1990s, Gibrat's law was largely defended as a general law, valid after firms achieve a MES level of output, but that does not apply to smaller firms operating at sub-optimal scales (Geroski, 1995) .
However, the more recent work of Lotti et al. (2009) found that, while Gibrat's law is more likely to be rejected ex ante, convergence toward Gibrat-like behavior over time is detected ex post; in other words, the reshaped and shrunken population of surviving and therefore most efficient firms exhibits within itself patterns of growth consistent with Gibrat's law.
Moreover, Daunfeldt and Elert (2013) demonstrated that the more disaggregated the data to be analyzed, the more likely Gibrat's law was to be confirmed.
The Swedish energy market
As in most European countries, the national energy market in Sweden was formerly dominated by a state-owned "national champion", Vattenfall, with a market share of more than 50%. To provide more efficient allocation of this essential service (electricity), the design and implementation of electricity market reform in the Nordic countries was urgent.
Deregulation of European electricity markets started in 1990, and by 2006 most OECD countries had to some extent liberalized their electricity markets (Al-Sunaidy and Green, 2006) . In Sweden, the electricity market was deregulated in 1996, when Sweden also joined the first international power exchange, NordPool (Lundgren, 2012) .
Meanwhile, inspired by the 1989 electricity reform in England and Wales, the EU electricity market directive came into force in 1997 guided by the belief that competition could produce better efficiency and lower prices than could traditional regulation. So far, the electricity market reform in Sweden has preceded the EU electricity market directive and been farther reaching than the directive prescribes.
Nevertheless, given the new regulatory framework, the major legacy companies could still exercise considerable market power on their respective home market and thus jeopardize the competitive electricity markets that the reforms were intended to create. The strategy adopted to solve this problem was market integration: between 1991 and 2000, the electricity markets of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden were opened up for competition in generation and retailing and were integrated into a single Nordic electricity market.
Moreover, thanks to the large share of hydropower, in conjunction with the uneven distribution of hydropower resources between the four Nordic countries, inter-connector capacities were already quite large. The barriers to cross-border trade were institutional rather than physical.
1 By abolishing border tariffs and adopting a system of distance-independent transmission prices, the relevant market was significantly enlarged and the market power of the major generators should be gradually diluted, particular the market power of Vattenfall in the Swedish energy market. In fact, although some major energy firms in Sweden have been continually accused of exercising market power, convincing proof is lacking (see Nylund, 2013 , pp. 1-2, and references therein). At the same time, power industry productivity has increased, and retail electricity prices (before tax) have become strongly linked to wholesale electricity prices (Bergman, 2005) .
Bergman (2002) concluded the gains from increased competition on the electricity market are likely to be greater in the medium and long terms than in the short term. However, these gains will not be realized unless competition is maintained. However, as the energy market is complex, the prospects for ongoing efficient competition are not entirely positive in view of the barriers to entry, mainly in generation, and the ongoing horizontal and vertical integration processes.
Data and empirical model

Data
In Sweden, all limited liability firms must submit their annual reports to the patent and registration office (PRV). The dataset used here was compiled by PAR, a Swedish consulting firm that gathers economic information from PRV, to be used mostly by decision-makers in Swedish commercial life. The data used here cover all Swedish limited liability companies in the energy sector that were active for at least one year between 1997 and 2011, for a total of 2185 firms and 18,137 firm-years. The data include variables found in the annual reports, such as revenue, profit measures, number of employees, salaries, and fixed costs.
In the data, firms are classified into the energy sector and various sub-sector industries according to the EU's NACE standard, a firm activity-based classification commonly employed by Statistics Sweden (SCB).
A main challenge in empirical research into firm growth is to homogenize the criteria for classifying the units of observation. A large range of indicators is used in growth studies, of which the number of employees and revenue are the most common (Delmar, 1997) .
As Kimberley (1976) stated, the number of employees was the most widely used measure of firm size at the time of the study. The number of employees reflects how internal processes are organized and adapts to changes in activity. Moreover, employment is not sensitive to inflation or currency exchange rates. This is especially useful for multi-sector analyses, in which sector-specific deflators need not be sought (Coad, 2009, p. 9) . Scholars agree that this variable is a direct indicator of organizational complexity and is suitable for analyzing the managerial implications of growth (Penrose, 1959) .
However, Delmar et al. (2003, p. 331) argued that the number of employees does not reflect "labor productivity increases, machine-for-man substitution, degree of integration, and other make-or-buy decisions". In addition, Gibrat's law, or Gibrat's law of proportionate growth, as it is sometimes called, gives rise to a continuous lognormal distribution while employment as a firm size indicator is a count data variable. Revenue, in this case, is then naturally taken as a better indicator of firm growth. In addition, compared with using revenue as the size variable, the number of employees variable suffers from indivisibilities, especially for small firms with only a few employees.
As they have both become common in the literature, and for purposes of comparison with other studies, both revenue and employment are used here to measure firm growth. However, for the reasons mentioned above, the estimated coefficients for employment should be interpreted with some caution. industry accounting for one-half of the industry's value of shipments. The most common proxies for MES are the size of the industry's median plant and the ratio of that plant's output to the industry total (Sutton, 1991) . In the present paper, the industry MES is measured not only as all firms' average revenue and number of employees, but also as the median of these measures during the study period.
2 The rationale for the classification is discussed in detail in section 4.2.
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Empirical model
As demonstrated by Mansfield (1962), Gibrat's law can be empirically tested in at least three ways. First, one can assume that, on average, it holds for all firms in a given industry, including those that have exited the industry during the period examined. Second, one can assume that it holds only for firms that survive the entire period examined. If survival is not independent of a firm's initial size, that is, if smaller firms are more likely to exit than are their larger counterparts, this empirical test can be affected by sample selection bias and estimates must take account of this possibility. This applies in particular to new and small firms, for which the hazard rate is generally high. Third, one can state that Gibrat's law applies only to firms large enough to have overcome the MES of a given industry; for example, Simon and Bonini (1958) found that the law was confirmed for the 500 largest US industrial corporations. Small firms operating in industries with a high MES, such as firms in the energy sector, should have a greater propensity to grow, since crossing the MES threshold ensures that the firm is large enough to survive. In previous studies, these three different subsamples have been used to study whether Gibrat's law on average holds in the studied
datasets.
An alternative perspective on this type of growth modeling is to recall that each firm appears to have its own growth trajectory or inherent growth trend instead of focusing directly on the mean growth responses to initial size. The resulting statistical model, called a random coefficient model for reasons that will be made clear below, implies a model resembling a generalized linear regression model with a particular covariance structure for each data vector.
This modeling strategy lets us address questions concerning growth trajectories and Gibrat's law for individual firms in the Swedish energy sector.
The following random coefficient model is used in the estimations.
where is the size of firm i, measured as either number of employees or as revenue, in the Swedish energy industry in time period t (t = 1997 … 2011) . is a vector of time-specific fixed effects that is included to capture time-variant heterogeneity in growth rates. The residual (or heterogeneity) term is specified as
where can be considered a "random parameter" or firm-specific random intercepts not estimated along with the fixed parameter a 0 ; therefore, the growth rates of the same firm are not necessarily independent given the observed covariates, which are the firm size one year before, , and the time-specific effects, . Meanwhile, we also included firm-specific random coefficients or slopes, , to allow the effect of the covariate to vary over each independent firm. We assume that the covariates and are exogenous with , ( | ) and E( ) = 0. In addition, both random intercepts and random coefficients are assumed to be independent across firms and years. The most general model estimated thus can be written as
or (4) where and . Given the assumptions above, the index parameter, , will give an unbiased estimate of the average effect of firm size on firm growth in the energy industry. Gibrat's law holds on average for the Swedish energy sector if equals one.
It is necessary to point out that it is the inclusion of the firm-specific random coefficients that makes it possible to determine whether Gibrat's law holds at the firm level. Gibrat's law holds for firm i if the total slope of a firm, , equals one, in which case the firm has reached a "steady state" around which growth deviates randomly.
A firm's specific total slope can be estimated by first estimating the parameters a 0 and a 1 using the method of maximum likelihood. The total residuals ̂ = -( ̂ ̂ ̂ ) are obtained directly afterwards. Then we fit individual regressions of ̂ and ̂ for both random intercepts and random coefficients on for each firm, using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. Each firm's total slope is therefore obtained by summing two estimated parts, i.e. ̂ ̂ ̂ (Rabe-Hesketh and Skronadal, 2005, p. 161).
Following Mansfield (1962) , the empirical analysis is then conducted by dividing the sample in three different ways: 1) including all firms, 2) according to whether they survived or failed during the observed period, and 3) according to whether they exceeded the MES in the Swedish energy industry. We focus on the firm-specific total slope, considering Gibrat's law at the firm level.
Since the individual firms' estimated total slopes rarely equal exactly one, to determine whether the growth pattern of each firm in the Swedish energy industry is in accordance with
Gibrat's law, one must assign a value to each firm's total slope. As seen from the model above, a firm's total slope consists of two parts, i.e. an unbiased estimate of the average effect of firm growth in the industry, a 1 , and a firm-specific random coefficient, , which is also each firm's deviation from the average effect. We say that Gibrat's law holds for a specific firm only if its individual total slope equals one, i.e. it is at its "steady state", with random variation around this level during the period under study.
As the first part of the estimation gives the estimated index parameter, ̂ , testing the null hypothesis that is equivalent to testing ( ). Using the standard error of the estimated random coefficient of each firm that comes from the second part of the estimation, we can easily calculate the t-statistic for each firm; this indicates the probability of the true value of equaling the hypothesized value . Hence, we say that a firm's total slope equals one if its converted p-value from the t-statistic is greater than or equal to 0.05.
Results
We start by estimating Equation (3) for the three models corresponding to Mansfield's (1962) three stages of Gibrat's law for the entire Swedish energy industry, using both revenue and the number of employees as measures of firm size. Meanwhile, the results of OLS estimations are also provided for comparison.
[ Table 2 about here]
The results concerning whether Gibrat's law holds on average for the Swedish energy industry are generally in accordance with those of most previous studies rejecting Gibrat's law. As presented in the tables above, the results of both the OLS regression and the random coefficient model indicate that a 1 < 1 irrespective of whether we use number of employees or revenue as our firm size variable, and also irrespective of whether all firms, only surviving firms, or only firms above the industry MES are included. This implies that small firms in the Swedish energy industry, on average, grow faster than do large firms and thus that firm growth is, on average, dependent on firm size.
Another way to interpret the results is to estimate each firm's specific total slope and determine the proportion of firms for which it can be considered to equal one. In this paper, firms' specific total slopes are assigned a value of one when their estimated total slopes are not statistically significantly different from one. We expect that Gibrat's law will hold for these firms even if the exact estimates of their specific total slopes do not exactly equal one.
Here, the results indicate that 71.31% of the firms have an assigned value equaling one when firm size is measured by revenue with all firms included in the sample. Meanwhile, in 70.65% of the cases, Gibrat's law holds when firm size is measured by employment (see Fig. 1 ). For the models including only surviving firms and firms exceeding the industry MES, the rate at which Gibrat's law holds is even higher, especially when MES is measured as the average revenue for all firms (see Figs. 1-3 below) . 
Summary and conclusions
Firm growth has long been widely studied in the economic literature. However, classical economists found it difficult to explain the presence of firms of heterogeneous sizes in the same industry. In this sense, Gibrat's law, which states that firm growth is a purely random effect resulting in firm sizes following a lognormal distribution, fits the empirical evidence well better. However, most research investigating whether Gibrat's law holds has used the ordinary least squares method to test whether or not the law holds on average in different industries. From the modeling point of view, this research ignores a firm's internal characteristics and growth trajectory.
We attempt to solve this problem empirically by using a random coefficient model to study whether Gibrat's law holds for individual firms in the Swedish energy industry. The results reject Gibrat's law from an "average" point of view: on average, small firms grow faster than do their larger counterparts in the Swedish energy industry.
However, when examining each firm individually, we find that a large proportion of Swedish energy firms behave in accordance with Gibrat's law. We emphasize again that those firms are considered to be in their "steady state", in which the stochastic process generating the size of the firm could be characterized by the behavior described in most passive or active learning models. In addition, when the selection effect discussed by Lotti et al. (2009) is taken into account, Gibrat's law holds for an even larger share of firms.
Finally, we must remind readers that our data reflect the process immediately after the Swedish electricity market was deregulated in 1996. The rationale for the deregulation was to help develop a more competitive Nordic electricity market. The present results indicate that the Swedish energy market seems to have worked fairly well during its approximately 20 years of operation. On average, the results indicate that smaller firms grow faster than do larger firms in the Swedish energy sector. In addition, when studying individual firms, the proportion of "large firms that are growing faster" is quite small.
In conclusion, the main finding of this study is consistent with the recent theoretical models of market selection and further confirms the validity of Gibrat's law at the firm level. When selection has been completed, a "steady state" is reached by most firms in the energy industry.
The results presented here also highlight some interesting avenues for future research. Most firms in the Swedish energy sector seem to have reached their "steady state" size of operations. There is a literature that discusses whether there is an optimal firm size, and the firms studied here are at their optimal size at least in the sense that it is the firm size desired by the owners, board of directors, and CEO. However, is this also an optimal size in the sense that firms that have reached their "steady state" are more profitable than other firms? The answer to this question is outside the scope of the present paper, but could be an interesting topic for future research. 
